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Abstract With the growing focus on prevention in medicine, studies of how to
describe risk have become increasing important. Recently, some researchers have
argued against giving patients ‘‘comparative risk information,’’ such as data about
whether their baseline risk of developing a particular disease is above or below
average. The concern is that giving patients this information will interfere with their
consideration of more relevant data, such as the specific chance of getting the
disease (the ‘‘personal risk’’), the risk reduction the treatment provides, and any
possible side effects. I explore this view and the theories of rationality that ground
it, and I argue instead that comparative risk information can play a positive role in
decision-making. The criticism of disclosing this sort of information to patients, I
conclude, rests on a mistakenly narrow account of the goals of prevention and the
nature of rational choice in medicine.
Keywords Decision making  Comparative risk  Prevention  Rationality 
Expected utility theory  Biomedical ethics
Introduction
As medicine increasingly emphasizes prevention, aiming to do a better job of
identifying and reducing patients’ risk of disease, important questions arise about
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how best to describe risk. Psychology distinguishes between two types of risk
information. On the one hand is ‘‘personal risk,’’ such as an individual’s chance of
developing a specific disease, expressed as a frequency or a probability. On the
other hand is ‘‘comparative risk,’’ such as whether an individual’s risk is average,
above average, or below average compared to people of the same age and gender.
Recent studies show that telling someone that his risk is above or below average has
a large impact on his perception of that risk and response to it [1–5].
Some researchers have pointed out that this influence appears to violate the
precepts of rational decision-making [5]. For example, when a woman is
considering a preventive treatment for breast cancer, it is reasonable to think that
she should accept it if the benefits outweigh the risks and other burdens, and reject it
if they don’t [5]. In this case, the relevant benefit is the reduction in the chance of
morbidity or mortality that the treatment can provide. The risks or burdens include
the price of the medication, the need for follow-up testing and doctor visits, and any
possible side effects. But all these factors can be assessed without considering
whether the individual’s baseline risk is average or above or below average.
Therefore, some researchers have argued that the impact of comparative risk
information on decision-making represents an irrational bias and conclude that this
data should not be provided to patients [5].1
In this paper, I examine the argument against comparative risk information, as I
will call it, and attempt to show that it is not convincing. The paper will progress as
follows. In the next section, I review psychological research into the effect of
comparative risk information compared to other methods of framing. Following
this, I analyze the argument against disclosing this information to patients and
interpret it as resting on a widely accepted account of rational decision-making
called ‘‘expected utility theory.’’ I then critique the attack on comparative risk
information, first, by pointing out ways that this data can be relevant to rational
decisions by patients with certain priorities, and, second, by raising questions about
some initially plausible assumptions concerning how to apply expected utility
theory to such cases. Finally, I consider wider implications for evaluating medical
decision-making, especially in the case of preventive services. The resulting
questions and challenges must be addressed in any attempt to improve the provision
of preventive services in the future.
Psychological research into comparative risk information
Empirical studies
Psychological research has shown that comparative risk information has a
significant impact on people’s attitudes and actions in many settings, even when
1 There are various terms used for the two kinds of information discussed here. ‘‘Personal risk’’ [4]
information is sometimes labeled ‘‘absolute risk’’ [2] or ‘‘objective risk’’ [1] information. ‘‘Comparative
risk’’ [5] information is sometimes called ‘‘social comparison risk’’ [1, 4] or ‘‘relative risk’’ [2]
information.
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such responses appear to be irrational [1–5]. For example, subjects who are told they
have a personal risk of 60% of causing a motor vehicle accident in their lifetime, but
are assured that this is below the average of 80%, judge themselves to be safer
drivers and have less interest in driving with care than do those who are told that
their personal risk is 30% but that this is above an average of 10% [1].
Similar results have been shown in experiments related to risk of disease. Even
when people are given specific information about the risk they have of developing a
certain disease, telling them that this risk is above or below that of other people
significantly affects their feelings about their own vulnerability and their decisions
concerning how to respond [2–4]. Interestingly, this effect is significant whether the
comparative group is made up of people of the same age and gender who have
average risk [1] or have the lowest possible risk [2], or is made up of people of the
opposite gender [3].
Fagerlin et al. [5] studied the impact of comparative risk data on women’s
willingness to accept a hypothetical preventive treatment. The researchers gave 254
women a scenario where they were asked to imagine that they have a 6% chance of
developing breast cancer in the next 5 years. Half were told in addition that this risk
is higher than average (with average set at 3%), while the other half were told that
their risk is below average (with average set at 12%). As part of the scenario, the
women were told that there is a pill available that cuts the risk of breast cancer in
half (e.g. reducing it from 6% to 3%, or from 12% to 6%). Finally, subjects were
given a list of the side effects of the pill, including hot flashes in the majority of
women taking it, cataracts in 1–2%, and a stroke or heart attack in under 1% [5].
After reading the scenario, the subjects answered a questionnaire where they
rated their willingness to take the pill and their belief that the risk reduction would
be ‘‘significant.’’ Women in the first group (who were told their personal risk was
above average) reported a higher interest in taking the pill than did those in the
second group (who were told that their risk was below average). Women in the first
group were also more likely to feel that the pill would provide a significant
reduction in their risk of breast cancer. Finally, all subjects were asked to rate the
helpfulness of the comparative data, and most rated it as extremely or somewhat
helpful [5]. In summary, even though all women were assigned the same personal
risk of 6%, being told that this was above or below average had a statistically
significant effect on their views concerning a possible preventive measure. This fits
with earlier research on the impact of comparative risk data [1–4].
The study can be criticized in a number of ways. Perhaps most importantly,
since it involves subjects responding to a hypothetical scenario, there is the possi-
bility that actual patients would respond differently, as the authors acknowledge
[5, p. 143]. In addition, even though the impact was statistically significant, one
might question whether it is clinically significant, that is, whether it would make a
difference in the decisions of many patients.
There are also a number of questions that the experiment was not designed to
answer. For example, the data do not indicate whether the subjects’ interest in the
treatment and their view of its significance was increased in patients with above
average risk, decreased in patients with below average risk, or both. Research in
other settings has suggested that although telling individuals that their risk is below
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average has a significant effect, telling them that their risk is above average has a
smaller effect, perhaps due to psychological ‘‘defense’’ mechanisms [1, 4].
Psychological theories
There are many possible theories for why people respond to comparative risk data as
they do. Perhaps the most widely accepted theory depicts the mind as utilizing a
‘‘dual representation’’ of risk, where one system registers the numerical description
of risk while another forms ‘‘more intuitive perceptions about whether an event will
occur’’ [3, p. 742]. Thus, personal risk data enters the first track, while comparative
risk data influences the second. Fagerlin and colleagues point to such factors when
they write,
People’s perceptions of risk are not merely cognitive appraisals of numeric
risk (e.g., 6% vs. 7%). They include intuitive and emotional reactions that
translate being ‘‘high’’ or ‘‘low’’ into ‘‘something to worry about’’ or
‘‘something to be relieved about’’ [5, p. 143].
Some have labeled this the ‘‘gist’’ impression of risk and have offered various
accounts for the role of this factor in people’s response to risk [6, 7].
Other approaches are possible. Many researchers in psychology have shown that
human decision-making involves irrational ‘‘heuristics and biases’’ [8, 9], and the
response to comparative risk data could be seen as one of these. A different
approach could be developed based on theories in evolutionary psychology, which
postulate mental modules that could have arisen during human evolution [10].
Given the many areas where comparison of ‘‘self to others’’ might have been
adaptive—such as in situations where an individual needs to assess his or her
strength, attractiveness, intelligence, etc.—a mental module could have been
selected that generates strong responses to comparative information. Such a module
could continue to operate now in response to risk information, even when there is
more reliable and relevant personal risk information available.
The argument against comparative risk information
The rejection of comparative risk information by Fagerlin and colleagues
After describing the results of their study, Fagerlin and colleagues argue that
patients should not be given comparative risk information when they are
considering preventive treatments. The researchers write:
We contend that the comparative risk information in this study was
uninformative and should not have changed risk perceptions. We believe
that a person’s decision should not be based on whether they consider
themselves at low or high risk but rather on whether they think that the
benefits of the treatment outweigh the associated risks…If a prevention
P. H. Schwartz
123
strategy reduces a person’s risk by half, it should not matter whether others
receive greater or lesser benefit from the pill [5, p. 142].
Fagerlin et al. go on to write that the comparative risk information can have
‘‘unintended results,’’ such as leading some women to feel less concerned about
their risk of getting breast cancer since it is below average [5, p. 142]. They
conclude:
When the goal of communication is to prepare patients to make informed
decisions, physicians should probably avoid providing patients with average
[comparative] risk information; such information will influence patients even
when the information is irrelevant to the decision at hand [5, p. 143].
The authors’ conclusions have a direct pragmatic impact, since the research was
inspired partly by an attempt to design a decision aid for women considering
whether to take the drug tamoxifen to prevent breast cancer. The risks, potential
benefits, and side effects of the treatment in the hypothetical scenario, the authors
write, were loosely patterned on this case. And the results of their study convinced
them that comparative risk data should not be included in the decision aid, even
though women generally ask for such information and the subjects in the study
reported that they found it useful [5]. Fagerlin et al. write, ‘‘Given the potential
biasing effects of comparison risk information, we must ask if it is wise to give
patients the information they want, since that information may actually harm them
(or at least bias their decision making)’’ [5, p. 143].
Fagerlin et al. do not explain their rejection of comparative risk information
further, but their reasoning is relatively clear. An individual woman should make
her decision about whether to take the pill based on whether ‘‘the benefits of the
treatment outweigh the associated risks’’ [5, p. 142]. Comparative risk information
is thus ‘‘potentially biasing’’ since it may have an impact on a woman’s decision
even though it does not carry any information about the risks and benefits that she
will experience.
It is important to note that this criticism of comparative risk information has
far-reaching implications. Current research in genetics and epidemiology aims to
develop ways to identify who is at increased risk for various diseases, partly so that
these individuals can be encouraged to make behavioral changes or undergo
recommended preventive tests or treatments. Since comparative risk information
can be more powerful than personal risk information at influencing the behavior of
people with increased risk [11], framing risk data comparatively would be
preferable in at least some settings. If the argument against comparative risk
information were correct, however, this option would not be available.
Comparative risk data and expected utility theory
To flesh out the argument against comparative risk information more fully, it is
necessary to review theories of rational decision-making as applied to this case.
According to expected utility theory, each possible state of affairs has a value for a
given individual, called its ‘‘utility,’’ based at least partly on the individual’s goals,
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interests, values, preferences, etc. [12, 13]. For medical interventions, for instance,
outcomes can be measured in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs),
falling in a range from 0 to 1, with 0 being death and 1 being perfect health.2 The
expected utility of an action is the sum of the utilities of each of the possible
outcomes, weighted by their probabilities. The rationally preferable choice, out of a
set of possible actions, is the one that maximizes expected utility.3
Consider a decision analysis concerning whether to take the pill described in
Fagerlin et al. [5]. For a woman who does not to take it, the two possible outcomes
can be described as having breast cancer (probability 6%), and not having breast
cancer (probability 94%).4 For a woman who takes the pill, there are more
outcomes to consider, involving the possible side effects. If we make the
simplifying assumption that the outcomes are mutually exclusive—e.g., that a
woman may get breast cancer or a heart attack, but not both—and assign specific
probabilities to each, one way of listing the possibilities would be the following:
• Having breast cancer—probability 3%;
• Having a cataract—probability 1.5%;
• Having a heart attack or stroke—probability 0.5%; or
• Being healthy except for hot flashes—probability 95%.
The final ingredient in constructing the decision analysis is to assign a utility to
each outcome, and this is a difficult task. Psychologists and health services
researchers struggle with the theoretical and pragmatic challenges of calculating
utilities or QALYs, and we will not delve into those issues here. One challenge
for assigning utilities is that an outcome such as having breast cancer includes a
range of possibilities, from having a tumor that is easily removed to having one
that has metastasized, and each specific outcome will have its own probability and
utility. Calculating the utility of the more general case—having breast cancer—
involves calculating a weighted average of the utilities of the more specific
possibilities.5
Table 1 presents a list of the utilities for the relevant outcomes for two
hypothetical women who are considering taking the preventive pill.6 Note that for
woman A, the preferred action is not to take the pill (expected utility
0.988 [ 0.944), while for B the preferred action is to take it (expected utility
2 QALYs and utilities may be more easily measured for a group, such as a population, rather than for
individuals. But many normative accounts of decision-making assign utilities to outcomes for specific
individuals as well [12], as I will do here.
3 Here, I will assume that ‘‘maximizing’’ involves simply choosing the action with the largest expected
utility. Assuming a different way of comparing outcomes, such as satisficing, fails to support the
argument against comparative risk information, as discussed in Section ‘‘Conclusion: The purpose of
disclosure.’’
4 These possibilities are listed as the outcomes of having the disease or not, rather than the event of
getting the disease or not, since utilities are attached to outcomes rather than events.
5 To be precise, the utility of an outcome is also best estimated for a specific time period, but I will ignore
this complication in this discussion.
6 I have assigned the utilities to the two women for the purpose of illustration, so these values should not
be assumed to be accurate for any actual people.
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0.987 [ 0.976). The difference between the women, in short, is that the utility of
having breast cancer is lower for B than for A (0.6 vs. 0.8), and the utility of living
with the various side effects is higher (i.e., B is less bothered by these possible
outcomes than A). Which of the two choices is right for each woman depends on
these specifics about the utility of the various possible outcomes for her.
This analysis shows further why comparative risk information appears irrelevant
to Fagerlin et al. [5]: the calculation of expected utility for each woman does not
include facts about whether she has above-average, average, or below-average risk.
To formalize this, I will define the term ‘‘irrelevant’’ here as follows:
(I) A piece of information is irrelevant to a decision if that information does not
convey information about the probability or utility of any of the relevant
outcomes.
Using this notion of ‘‘irrelevant,’’ an intuitive principle based on expected utility
theory completes the argument:
(P) Irrelevant information (as defined in (I)) cannot improve, and may interfere
with, the rationality of an individual’s decision.
According to (P), it appears that a woman who makes her decision based on
comparative risk data is losing sight of the key issue, i.e., whether the pill will
maximize her expected utility.
Caring about risk level
In the next three sections, I critique the argument against comparative risk
information. In this section, I argue that comparative risk data is not always
irrelevant to decisions about prevention, once we recognize a wider range of factors
that may affect the utilities of possible outcomes for individuals. In the next section,
Table 1 Calculating expected utility for the decision involving the preventive treatment described in
Fagerlin et al. [5]
Outcome Probability Utility
Woman A Woman B
(1) Decision = not to take the pill
Having breast cancer 0.06 0.8 0.6
Not having breast cancer 0.94 1 1
Expected utility 0.988 0.976
(2) Decision = Take the pill
Having breast cancer 0.03 0.8 0.6
Having a cataract 0.015 0.93 0.97
Having a heart attack/stroke 0.005 0.8 0.85
Having hot flashes 0.95 0.95 1
Expected utility 0.944 0.987
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I raise questions regarding principle (P), partly based on consideration of theories of
rationality. In the concluding section, I consider consequences for the general
evaluation of rationality, disclosure, and decisions in medicine.
Although comparative risk data appears irrelevant to the decision analysis
depicted in Table 1, an individual can have desires that make comparative risk
relevant to determining the utilities of at least some outcomes for her. In these cases,
the information is not irrelevant in the sense of (I). For example, consider a woman
who wants her risk of breast cancer to be average or below average. She sees her life
as going better if her risk falls in this range, independently of whether she ever
actually develops the disease. For her, the utilities of the various outcomes listed in
Table 1 may be affected by facts about her risk level. Consider a woman whose
baseline risk for breast cancer is above average and will be below average if she
takes the preventive treatment (e.g., it will drop from 8% to 4%). Call her Woman C
and assume that she is just like Woman A described in Table 1, except that Woman
C cares about having average-or-below-average risk for breast cancer. Because of
this preference, the utilities for various outcomes for Woman C may be slightly
different than they are for Woman A.
For instance, if Woman C does not take the pill, then the utility of the outcome of
not having breast cancer may be slightly lower than 1, since even though she has
avoided breast cancer, she has to live with above average risk, which has negative
utility for her. If Woman C does take the pill, then the utilities of all the outcomes
under this choice on Table 1 (‘‘Decision = Take the Pill’’) may be slightly higher
for her than for Woman A, since in all these cases Woman C lives for at least some
time with below average risk, which has positive utility for her. These slight
changes in the utilities of individual outcomes could raise the expected utility of
taking the pill above that of not taking the pill. Thus, it appears that the comparative
risk information could be relevant to Woman C’s decision whether to take the pill.
The discussion by Fagerlin et al. [5] and in the previous section, above, did not
consider the possibility that a woman would care in this way about her risk level.
Instead, these discussions focused, understandably enough, on health outcomes such
as breast cancer and heart attacks. But after considering the example of Woman C, it
becomes apparent that comparative risk levels may be relevant to determining the
utility of outcomes for at least some individuals. Other unanticipated features of
situations may be relevant as well, for instance how treatment or illness would
interfere with work, or with a weekly tennis game, etc. It is basically impossible to
anticipate the range of issues that may come into play in determining the utilities of
possible outcomes for individuals, given the wide variety of desires and interests.
The fact that decision theory treats any interest that the individual has as being
legitimate fodder for decision analysis reflects a more general philosophical
approach stemming back to Hume, where a person’s rational capacities do not
determine her goals but instead are used to calculate how best to pursue them [14]. It
is assumed that in a free society, people will have widely varying goals and desires,
and a broad range of these are considered consistent with rationality [15].
Also, there is good reason to believe that preferring to have average-or-below-
average risk for breast cancer or other diseases is common in modern society.
Although a person may be perfectly healthy and have increased risk at the same
P. H. Schwartz
123
time, there are important analogies between having normal levels of risk and being
healthy. Health is usually defined as normalcy of some sort, often related to the
presence of typical levels of functioning [16], and having average risk is a type of
typicality or normality as well [17]. The details of the definition of health and
disease are complex and fall beyond the scope of this paper, but there are apparent
links between the importance of health and of normalizing risk [18, 19].
In the case of tamoxifen, which serves as the model for the pill described to
subjects in Fagerlin et al. [5], it is relevant to note that many of the women who
qualify for use of this medication for prevention of breast cancer may well harbor a
dysfunction, such as a mutation in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene [20]. Telling a
woman that she has above average risk may thus alert her to the presence of a disease
or abnormality, and in this way comparative risk information may be quite relevant to
her making a decision about her medical care. Admittedly, some women who have
elevated risk of breast cancer and qualify for possible treatment with tamoxifen have
no identifiable disease or dysfunction. For example, a woman may have elevated risk
due to factors such as age, a history of early menarche or few or no pregnancies, and
family members who had breast cancer [20]. But, even in this case, the desire to have
‘‘normal’’ risk seems not so far removed from the desire to be healthy, which is given
pride of place in medical ethics and philosophy of medicine.
Evaluating (P) and theories of rationality
Problems with (P)
The defense of comparative risk information presented above, based on the
importance that some people may place on having average-or-below-average risk, is
not an entirely adequate response to the attacks. Perhaps most importantly, some
people do not care whether their risk level is above or below average. For such
people, the comparative risk data are irrelevant, as defined in (I).
But there are other flaws in the argument against comparative risk information,
most importantly centering on principle (P). In particular, there are counterexamples
to it, i.e., cases where a piece of irrelevant information can increase the chance of an
individual’s making a rational decision. For example, consider a woman who
underestimates the chance that she will get breast cancer. Even after being told that
she has a 6% risk of developing this disease in the next 5 years, she acts and feels as
if the chance is lower. In this case, telling the woman that her risk is above average
may increase her concern about the possibility of getting breast cancer and thus may
help to bring her risk perception into closer correlation with reality. Therefore,
giving her comparative risk information may make her more likely to act in keeping
with expected utility theory.7
7 I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the following case, where comparative risk
information may also improve decision-making. Consider a woman with above average risk who is
reluctant to undergo treatment with tamoxifen since she doesn’t know anybody else who is taking the
medication. In this case, telling her that her risk is above average may help counteract her reluctance—
which is irrational on the basis of expected utility theory—by explaining why she is different from other
women she knows.
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Similarly, consider a woman who generally overestimates her risk, even after
hearing that her personal risk is 6%. If her risk level is below average, then telling
her this—providing comparative risk information—may lead her to form a more
accurate assessment of her risk and lead her to make a decision that is more closely
in line with expected utility theory.
Admittedly, there are other situations where comparative risk information can
decrease the accuracy of risk perception, such as when a woman who overestimates
her risk is told that her risk is above average, or when a woman who underestimates
her risk is told that her risk is below average.
Only empirical research can determine which situations are more common, i.e.,
ones where comparative risk will improve accuracy or worsen it. There are multiple
factors that may lead a person to overestimate or underestimate her risk, even after
he or she is given personal risk information. Research into the optimism bias, for
instance, shows that many people have a tendency to underestimate the chance of an
undesirable event that they may undergo [21, 22]. In contrast, Tversky and
Kahneman [9] describe settings in which individuals have a tendency to
overestimate the chance of rare events. There is evidence that many women
overestimate their risk of breast cancer, perhaps due to the large amount of reporting
about the disease and public health messages encouraging women to get
mammograms [23].
Again, only further research can determine whether patients considering
preventive treatments of various sorts have accurate ideas regarding their baseline
risk, and whether providing comparative risk information improves or worsens their
decision making, considered in light of expected utility theory. Still, since it
possible that comparative risk information will help some women make better
decisions, principle (P) is false. And thus, even for decision analyses where
comparative risk information is irrelevant—as for women who do not care about
their risk levels, per se—one cannot be certain that such information should not be
given.
Accounts of rationality
A supporter of the argument against comparative risk information might respond
that even if such information were to improve the accuracy of a woman’s perception
of her risk, and thus were to increase the chance that she will choose an action
favored by expected utility theory, it would not, by so doing, increase the rationality
of her decision. Thus, such a supporter could argue, the hypothetical case should not
be taken as a counterexample to (P).
Evaluating this response requires assessing whether the rationality of a decision
is determined by the process of decision-making or the outcome [10, 24]. In short,
the defense of (P) considered here depends on seeing rationality as based on an
evaluation of the process, where a fully rational decision is one where the individual
understands the relevant outcomes, probabilities, and utilities, and then uses them to
calculate and maximize expected utility. The ‘‘Standard Picture,’’ as some theorists
have dubbed this approach, sees a rational decision as one made ‘‘in accordance
with principles of reasoning that are based on rules of logic, probability theory and
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so forth’’ [25, p. 4]. Someone who is committed to the Standard Picture could argue
that a woman who overestimates her personal risk, and then is reassured (for no
good reason) by her comparative risk, is not acting in accordance with central
‘‘principles of reasoning.’’
But this defense of (P) has two major weaknesses. First, it is not clear that using
comparative risk information to correct a misperception concerning risk is truly a
deviation from principles of reasoning. Perhaps the influence of this information
should be seen as helping the individual form an accurate assessment of her risk,
and thus as helping her make a decision in keeping with the Standard Picture.
Perhaps the information improves her perception, and she then reasons correctly
based on it.
Second, problems with the Standard Picture weaken this defense of (P). Research
has shown that humans perceive risk and choose actions in ways that rarely conform
to the strict standards assumed by the Standard Picture [10, 24]. As mentioned in the
discussion of the dual representation model above, individuals appear to make
decisions partly based on their general sense of the significance of the risk, separate
from any quantitative representation of its magnitude [3, 5, 7]. In addition, evidence
concerning heuristics and biases of human thought and evolutionary psychology
suggest that people reason in a variety of ways that do not match the Standard
Picture [10, 24].
For these reasons, many theorists have adopted a model of rationality that focuses
on the outcomes of decision-making rather than the process. According to the
‘‘consequentialist’’ or ‘‘pragmatic’’ approach, ‘‘what it is for a reasoning process to
be a good one is for it to be an efficient means of attaining the pragmatic objective
of satisfying one’s personal goals and desires’’ [10, p. 40]. From such a perspective,
analyses of expected utility may be useful in determining the best choice for an
individual, in some sense, but any process for reliably arriving at that choice will
count as rational [13, pp. 53–59]. And from the perspective of the pragmatic
approach, if comparative risk information can reliably improve the success of
individuals at maximizing their expected utility, then the information can form a
key part of rational decision-making.
One of the strongest arguments supporting the pragmatic approach to rationality
is that there is no clear benefit to reasoning according to any strict standards—such
as those assumed by the Standard Picture—if there is a different process that can
just as reliably guide the individual to choices that will maximize utility [10]. In
addition, given the limited amount of time available in many situations and the finite
amount of human brainpower, utilizing ‘‘fast, frugal algorithms’’ may be rationally
advisable [26]. It seems very possible that comparative risk information could play a
role in such a heuristic for decisions about preventive measures.
An alternative to (P)
For the remainder of this paper, I will adopt the pragmatic definition of rationality.
But once we adopt this definition, the argument against comparative risk
information can be regenerated utilizing a principle that is closely related to (P).
The relevant principle is the following (with the changes from (P) in italics):
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(P’) Irrelevant information (as defined in (I)) will not reliably improve, and will
often interfere with, the rationality of an individual’s decision.
As described above, although there are hypothetical situations where compar-
ative risk information will increase the accuracy of a person’s risk perception, there
are also many where the information will reduce accuracy. Thus, one might adopt
(P’) and conclude that comparative risk information should not be given. From this
perspective, until empirical research can disprove (P’), the prudent option is to avoid
giving comparative risk data.
A major problem with this form of the argument is that it relies on the assumption
that information should be withheld if its overall impact is unknown. One could
argue just as easily that even if (P’) is true, as long as there is no proof that a type of
information will always interfere with patients’ making rational decisions, then it
should be provided. As Fagerlin et al. write, women ask whether their risk is above
or below average and most subjects in their experiment rated the comparative risk
data as being helpful [5]. Given this eagerness, uncertainty about the effect of the
information seems to favor providing it rather than withholding it.
Remember as well that psychological research suggests that even if comparative
risk information is not explicitly provided, individuals still utilize unstated
comparisons to form an intuitive sense of the seriousness of the risk they face
[3]. So a personal risk of 6% may sound high to one person and low to another, for
all sorts of reasons, including their beliefs about typical risk or even their previous
assumptions about their own risk [27]. Providing explicit comparative risk
information does not introduce a new factor into risk perception, and may even
correct misperceptions.
Conclusion: the purpose of disclosure
Closely examining the argument against comparative risk information demonstrates
how difficult it is to arrive at any firm conclusions about whether a certain type of
information will help or hinder rational decision-making. And the discussion shows
that even if a piece of information will mislead or confuse some people, it is not a
simple matter to conclude that the information should not be given. Perhaps it is
enough that it will help selected individuals, or that patients generally want the
information and will feel uncomfortable if it is withheld. In short, there are complex
questions to consider regarding the purpose of disclosure and the ethical principles
regarding patient choice.
The discussion also highlights the difficulty of determining if a specific decision
is rational or not in light of expected utility theory. A patient’s decision to take
tamoxifen, for example, could be due to a calculation that this will maximize her
expected utility, as for woman B in Table 1. But, alternatively, it may be that taking
the pill does not maximize her expected utility—e.g., if her utilities resemble those
of woman A in Table 1—and she is miscalculating in one way or another. The
woman may be overestimating her chance of developing breast cancer, as in the
cases considered above (Section ‘‘Problems with (P)’’), or she may be making other
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possible mistakes. For instance, the patient may be underestimating the utility of life
with breast cancer (i.e., overestimating the impact), such as by failing to recognize
the large percentage of patients who are treated conservatively and/or cured.
Alternatively, the patient could be underestimating the frequency of having one of
the side effects of tamoxifen, or overestimating the severity of those side effects
(and underestimating, therefore, the expected utility of taking the medication).
Given all these possibilities, it is exceedingly difficult to know for any given
patient whether or not he is making a decision that maximizes his expected utility. It
is important to note as well that doctors generally do not carry out such fine-grained
evaluations of their patients’ decisions. In fact, healthcare providers often do not
even assess their patients’ understanding of basic information, much less examine
whether the decision fits with their values or goals [28]. Anecdotal information
suggests that a patient’s decision is challenged only when it appears to violate his
best interests, as when an individual turns down a non-burdensome life-saving
treatment.
It may be that healthcare providers are aiming to help their patients maximize
expected utility but are operating within informational or pragmatic constraints.
Alternatively, providers may be applying a different theory of rationality, such as
one that does not require maximizing expected utility but just satisficing, i.e.,
finding an outcome that is ‘‘good enough’’ [29]. Such theories of bounded rationality
resemble the pragmatic or consequentialist approaches discussed above by
emphasizing that real-life decisions are made based on limited information, using
finite brain power, in an environment where ‘‘fast, frugal, heuristics’’ may be very
helpful [26, 30]. If a theory of bounded rationality were assumed, the argument
against providing comparative risk information would be weak, since these theories
make no assumption that formally irrelevant information is not helpful to good
decisions. Also, a satisficing account of decision-making could conclude that the
decision to take tamoxifen or reject it may both be equally rational for a given
patient, if both choices are ‘‘good enough.’’
Finally, it may be that healthcare providers are not oriented primarily towards
promoting rational decisions and that accounts of patient decision-making should
not assume that this is the goal of disclosure and informed consent. A number of
writers have questioned the assumption that patients always want or need
information that will allow them to make an ‘‘autonomous’’ decision [31, 32],
and some have proposed that the doctor-patient interaction should be interpreted
instead in terms of speech acts such as asking permission or showing respect [33].
For such approaches, the evaluation of whether to give comparative risk
information, and in what settings, involves very different considerations than those
raised by Fagerlin et al. [5].
In the end, the discussion highlights the complex issues that must be considered
in deciding what information to provide to patients concerning available preventive
tests or treatments [34]. And decisions of this sort are becoming increasingly
important, with medicine’s growing focus on prevention and with progress in
genetics and epidemiology promising to make much more detailed risk information
available to patients and providers in the future. Clarifying the goals of disclosing
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information in preventive settings, and then finding ways to achieve these goals, will
be a central task of medicine and medical ethics in the coming years.
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